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EMBLEMS OF FEDERALISM
Carol Weisbrod*
This Article reviews non-state federalism-more accurately
"not only state federalism"- sometimes called pluralism or
essential federalism,1 and contrasts it with conventional
political federalism, referred to here as "monumental federal-
ism" and presented through a description of a painting by
Erastus Field.2
Conceptions of non-state federalism can take several forms.
Some versions of non-state federalism stress the idea of
sovereignty, noting that sovereignty can be located in groups
other than the state. These versions fit well with the way we
view Indian tribes, religious groups, and other organizations
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut. J.D., Columbia Law School, 1961.
A paper including a discussion of Yoder v. Helmuth, No. 35747 (Ohio C.P. Wayne
County Nov. 7, 1947), was presented at the Conference of the International Communal
Studies Association, Elizabethtown, Pennsylvania, in July 1991. That paper has been
published in Communal Societies, under the title Communal Groups and the Larger
Society: Legal Dilemmas, 12 COMMUNAL SOC'Y 1 (1992). Earlier versions of the present
essay were presented as a Clason Lecture at Western New England College School of
Law in October 1991 and at the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Symposium, Preservation of Minority Cultures (Feb. 15, 1992) (audiotape on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). I learned from the conversation
in each of these settings.
I would also like to thank the following individuals for assistance of various kinds:
Milner Ball, Anne Goldstein, Richard Kay, Leon Lipson, Carl Schneider, Aviam Soifer,
Pamela Sheingorn, and Stephen Weisbrod.
1. Alexander Pekelis uses the phrase "essential federalism" to describe American
federalism. He sees American federalism as consisting of a plurality of legal systems
each of which possesses a great deal of individual autonomy. These legal systems include
not just states, but private groups, such as unions and churches, as well. ALEXANDER
H. PEKELIS, LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION 67-68 (1950); see also Carol Weisbrod, Towards a
History of Essential Federalism: Another Look at Owen in America, 21 CONN. L. REV.
979, 1003-11 (1989). Harold Laski writes that "any society, at bottom, is essentially
federal in nature." HAROLD J. LASIu, POLITICS 68 (1931). Laski argues that because society
is essentially federal, a state's power will be more effective as it becomes more widely
dispersed. Voluntary associations, therefore, should be "integrally related to the process
of government." Id. at 69.
2. This Article does not use Field's work of art to consider theories of criticism or
interpretation. Rather, the present Article is a contribution to a hypothetical "emblem
book" whose subject is the history of American "essential federalism." The Oxford
Companion to Art defines emblem books as "books of symbolic pictures accompanied by
explanatory texts." THE OXFORD COMPANION TO ART 369 (Harold Osborne ed., 1970). The
pictures used here as symbols are a painting by Erastus Field, see infra notes 6-26 and
accompanying text, and a photograph of a courtroom scene, see infra notes 74-104 and
accompanying text.
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whose functioning can be seen in terms of unofficial but state-
like authority and law. 3 In these versions of federalism, an
individual really belongs to two sovereign groups: state and
church or state and tribe.
Another version of non-state federalism sees the individual
as belonging to many different kinds of groups-some voluntary
and others not 4 - only some of which can comfortably be called
sovereign. Here the state often is presented with the question
of how it should deal with a particular interaction between
an individual and a group that has resulted in the individual
suffering an injury so acute that the state is asked for help.5
This Article suggests that in dealing with individual/group
issues, representatives of the state should focus on questions
arising out of the particular injury and the particular group
affiliation, instead of the characteristics of the groups involved
(for example, whether they can be called sovereign, or whether
they operate legal systems). The state representatives then
should determine on a case-by-case basis whether state
intervention is justified or sensible.
Part I of this Article describes monumental or state-centered
federalism in part through a description of a painting by
Erastus Field. Part II discusses some theoretical alternatives
to the state-centered model of federalism, focusing on the ideas
of the Dutch politician and theologian Abraham Kuyper and
3. For an exercise in formal pluralist analysis along these lines, see Carol Weisbrod,
Family, Church and State: An Essay on Constitutionalism and Religious Authority, 26
J. FAM. L. 741 (1987-88) (analyzing the relations between church and state in the United
States and using religion as an example of non-state authority).
One can, of course, call individuals "sovereign," as do certain anarchist thinkers, and
use individuals as the basic unit of analysis. See Weisbrod, supra note 1, at 1003
(discussing individualist anarchism and the concept of self as sovereign). One also can
redefine law so that it exists in the minds of individuals-in which case every individual
operates a legal system and it becomes possible to discuss state recognition of conscience
in terms of legal pluralism. Carol Weisbrod, Practical Polyphony: Theories of the State
and Feminist Jurisprudence, 24 GA. L. REV. 985, 1007-11 (1990) (discussing Leon
Petrazycki's ideas).
These more individualistic conceptualizations of sovereignty can be contrasted to
cultural pluralism, which often assumes a state-centered universe. See generally Nomi
M. Stolzenberg & David N. Myers, Community, Constitution, and Culture: The Case of
the Jewish Kehilah, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. at 633, 660 (1992).
4. See Aviam Soifer, On Being Overly Discrete and Insular: Involuntary Groups
and the Anglo-American Judicial Tradition, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 381, 383 (1991)
(discussing "involuntary associations," groups we are born into and may be unable to
leave-for example, racial groups or families).
5. The group might also ask for help from the state (when an individual at first
has agreed to a group enterprise, for example, and then resists it and refuses to leave
the premises when asked to do so).
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the Russian anarchist Prince Peter Kropotkin. Part III offers
an overview of the individual-group-state relation in practical
terms, as seen from within a state system, and begins a
discussion on the practice of shunning. Part IV uses an Amish
shunning case to illustrate the problem of state intervention
in individual-group conflicts and, by comparing that case with
others, suggests the types of questions that the state system
might raise when faced with this issue.
I. MONUMENTAL FEDERALISM
Erastus Field's Historical Monument of the American
Republic6 can be seen as a pictorial representation of the
conventional features ofAmerican federalism. Field's painting
is about history, not about theories of federalism, but it seems
that much of the painting, to the extent that it describes
political (rather than social) history, implicates federalism.
The painting was begun in the 1860s and Field finished most
of the piece by 1867. In 1876, Field added the Philadelphia
Centennial Exhibition Hall to the top of what was called the
Central Tower, and, in 1888, he finished the painting by adding
the two end towers.7 Mary Black, who compiled a catalog of
Field's work, recorded that Field saw the painting as "the
culmination and chief work of his long career. "'
Frank Jenkins described the painting as follows:
From a formal garden, reminiscent of the brand-new
park of an industrial town, rise ten great towers,
circular and polygonal in plan, made up of sections
diminishing as they rise. These are encrusted with
6. The painting is reproduced on page 798. The painting is on exhibit at the
Museum of Fine Arts in Springfield, Massachusetts as part of the Morgan Wesson
Memorial Collection. I appreciate the courtesy of the Museum in authorizing reproduction
here.
7. MARY BLACK, ERASTUS SALISBURY FIELD: 1805-1900, at 41 (1984).
8. Id. Field was an itinerant painter who spent most of his career in the Northeast.
Mary C. Black, Erastus Salisbury Field and the Sources of His Inspiration, 83 ANTIQUES,
Feb. 1963, at 201, 201-04. Black writes that in 1933 the painting was found rolled up
in the attic of a relative's home, and "[ilt was rescued by Madeline Ball Wright, Field's
grand-niece, from ignominious storage in a shed behind a pig sty in Plumtrees in the
mid-1940's." BLACK, supra note 7, at 47.
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an incredible array of architectural bric-a-brac. Almost
every style is represented-Egyptian, Greek, Roman,
even medieval machicolations are introduced. Seven
of the telescope-like towers are joined near their
summits by delicate iron suspension bridges, across
which steam-trains puff.9
As Black noted in her catalog, "Every level of every tower
in Field's Monument is keyed to an incident in American history
.... "'0 Apparently, the "idea of an historical painting on a
grand theme had been with Field since the beginning of his
career. The evolution of his plan followed a long progress likely
to have been conceived as early as November 1824 when he
entered Samuel Morse's studio as an apprentice student.""
Field himself published a descriptive catalog of The Historical
Monument of the American Republic which predates the
addition of the two final towers. 2 The catalog begins with a
paragraph explaining Field's ultimate intention: he wanted
a real structure to be built. Following the plan depicted in
the painting, the structure would have a central tower sur-
rounded by other large and elaborate towers. 3 The various
human figures in the painting would be statues with "[t]he
dark figures ... represented in bronze to denote the colored
race.
" 14
The Field catalogue contains a note of apology. "I am not
a professed architect," Field wrote, "and some things about
it may be faulty. Be that as it may, my aim has been to get
up a brief history of our country or epitome, in a monumental
form." 5 Field explained that the columns represent the
colonies and the states. He also described not only each of the
towers, but each of the small pictures on the towers, beginning
9. Frank . Jenkins, Some Nineteenth-Century Towers, J. ROYAL INST. BRIT. ARCHrTECTS,
Feb. 1958, at 124, 126.
10. BLACK, supra note 7, at 41.
11. Id. at 42. Black notes that "Field was as violently opposed to slavery as Morse
was for it. While both men opposed secession, their divergent views made the interpreta-
tion of the Monument as it came from Field a far different painting than anything Morse
might have created." Id.
12. E FIEID, DESCaIu'w CATALOGUE OF nE HuS1RICAL MONumENr OF THE AMEICAN
REPUBLIC (1876) (reprint on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
13. Id. at 1.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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with the settlement of Jamestown by the English in 1607.'"
The figures on the first or central tower consist of armies,
presidents, and the forty-fourth Congress. 17 The other towers
have elaborate representations of various battles and incidents
in American history, placing considerable emphasis on the Civil
War. Outside the towers we see ladies and gentlemen out for
a walk and troops "marching around the monument which
illustrates the centennial anniversary of the American
Independence." 8  The Monument includes text from the
Declaration of Independence 9 and a long essay on the critical
importance of the Bible. The platform of the main towers,
which Field called The True Base or T.T.B., represents Ameri-
can history.2' Although conceived as a plan for an architectural
work, Field's monument remains a painting. No structure
based on the painting has ever existed.2'
We can view Erastus Field's folk painting as representing
a federal scheme focused on political units (states and colonies),
imbedded in huge towers, which are connected in various ways
to the whole. It is a painting emphasizing public officials,
armies, and great political controversies. It seems to represent
a conception of federalism involving the federal government
and the states-hierarchical, integrated, and titanic-which
is dominant in American history. Field's painting was said
16. Id. at 1, 4. Field's description of a portion of the eighth tower in the center of
the painting indicates the level of his detail:
Above the constitution are seen individuals watching for a chance to assassinate
the heads of the government. Seward is on his bed. Above on the great platform
the assassin Booth is shooting the President. Washington is near by expressing
astonishment at such a deed. Under the canopies on the pillars, people are weeping.
Above is seen the funeral procession of the President. Above is his tomb. On the
top of the eighth tower President Lincoln is ascending in a fiery chariot and an
angel is in the act of crowning him.
Id. at 10.
Frederick Robinson observed that while the painting "cannot be called great art, it
is outstanding in the field of folk-art. And of even greater importance it provides still
further insight into the philosophy and thought of 19th century America." Frederick
B. Robinson, Erastus Salisbury Field, ART IN AM., Oct. 1942, at 244, 253.
17. FIELD, supra note 12, at 10-11.
18. Id. at 11.
19. Id. at 6.
20. Robinson, supra note 16, at 253.
21. The painting is perhaps in a tradition of"impossible buildings." See THE GRAPHIc
WORK OF M.C. ESCHER 5,22 (1967) (classifying three of Escher's lithographs, Belvedere,
Ascending and Descending, and Waterfall, as "impossible buildings").
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to be preoccupied with height. 22 And so, one might say, is
political federalism. Furthermore, the federalist position from
the start focused on central authority, a tendency which is
generally seen to have strengthened over time. It is standard,
I think, to assume that the New Deal marks an immense
consolidation of the centralized-activist' American republic,
perhaps along the lines of the structurally integrated model
used by Erastus Field.
At the same time, even the version of federalism which Field
presented suggests the multiple-sovereignty account of non-
state federalism. For instance, on one of the towers of Field's
Monument is a depiction of William Penn's treaty with the
Indians.2' Penn's treaty has significance for the way we look
at federalism because Indians are one of the groups prominent
in current thinking about group rights.25 It is this sense of
22. See Jenkins, supra note 9, at 126.
23. This vision of the centralized-activist state animates the work of many legal
academics. Although, Mirjan Damaska notes, the American view of the liberal activist
state continues to recognize the"autonomy of the individual" and sees that limited govern-
mental role is desirable, even while "government responsibility for the solution of social
problems is increasingly recognized." M]RJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE
AUTHORITY 72 n.1 (1986). For a discussion of the activist state in its extreme form, see
id. at 80-88.
Akhil Amar describes our current political framework as follows:
We inhabit a world whose constitutional terrain is dominated by landmark Su-
preme Court cases invalidating state laws and administrative practices in the name
of individual constitutional rights. Living in the shadow of Brown v. Board of
Education and the second Reconstruction of the 1960's, many lawyers embrace
a tradition that views state governments as the quintessential threat to individual
and minority rights, and federal officials-especially federal courts- as the special
guardians of those rights.
Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1133 (1991)
(footnotes omitted). He notes also that "[wihat has been lost in this twentieth-century
debate is the crucial Madisonian insight that localism and liberty can sometimes work
together, rather than at cross-purposes." Id. at 1136.
24. The picture of the treaty is derivative, apparently taken from Benjamin West's
painting Penn's Treaty with the Indians. Black, supra note 8, at 203.
Penn's treaty with the Delaware Indians may be mythical. See FRANCIS JENNINGS,
THE AMBIGUOUS IROQUOIS EMPIRE 236 (1984) (noting that Penn's early Great Treaty with
the Delawares "exists only in tradition"). Jennings also says, however, that there is "much
reason to believe the legend of the Great Treaty of friendship made by Penn with the
Delawares .... The legend has been so strong that Benjamin West painted a tremendous
anachronistic canvas of the imagined scene." Id. at 245-46.
25. Seegenerally ROBERT A_ WILLAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT (1990); Milnor S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 1; Robert N. Clinton, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples as Collective Group Rights,
32 AIZ. L. REV. 739 (1990); Perry Dane, The Maps of Sovereignty: A Meditation, 12
CARDOZO L. REV. 959 (1991).
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group right that the early Penn treaty illustrates; that Penn's
arrangement with the Indians was a treaty recognizes the
notion of tribal sovereignty. We are accustomed to saying that
the Indians' tribal sovereignty marks their entirely anomalous
status in American law.26
If we say that the great treaty tradition which found its way
into Erastus Field's Monument is also a part of the federalist
tradition, we then might ask whether the treaty approach to
internal groups has manifested itself in relation to groups other
than Indians. One answer would be that those theorists who
focus on groups in the context of the problem of private
government at least implicitly employ this approach, whether
they place emphasis on the control of groups or on group
autonomy. Thus, it is not surprising, for example, that in 1930
Zechariah Chafee referred to the fact that "[c]onflicts between
the state and powerful organizations are bound to arise, and
it may be wiser to demarcate their respective functions by
treaty negotiations than by litigation, in which the state
necessarily acts as judge in its own cause." 27  The group
sovereignty perspective also is linked to the issues of group
rights raised in some of the historical and current 2 discussions
of international human rights.'
Despite the growth of federal activity, even the New Deal3"
period provides examples of non-state federalism. One
illustration of this decentralization is the community-building
programs of the New Deal.3' The Indian Reorganization Act 32
26. See, e.g., JENNINGS, supra note 24, at 244 (noting that Penn conceived of the
Indians as "having their own governments").
27. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV.
L. REV. 993, 1027 (1930).
28. For recent discussions on the rights of groups and indigenous populations, see
generally THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES (James Crawford ed., 1988) (including essays on the
subject of"peoples" or group rights in the international context); Symposium, The Rights
of Ethnic Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (1991) (collecting essays on national,
ethnic, and minority rights).
29. See generally PAT cK TI1R Y, INiqmcNAL LAW AND THE RIm OF NiORiS
(199 1) (reviewing historical material discussing issues of individual and collective rights).
30. It was clear by the 1930s that big changes had occurred. Felix Frankfurter,
for instance, contrasted an earlier period, when "[t]he interdependencies of men were
relatively narrow, and there was no conception of the state as an active promoter of
civilization," with a later time when the function of "[g]overnment is no longer merely
to keep the ring, to be a policeman, to secure the observance of elementary decencies
.... It is being drawn upon for all the great ends of society." FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE
PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 15, 24 (1930). He noted too that federal activity expanded
without state activity contracting. Id at 28-29.
31. See generally PAUL K. CONKLIN, TOMORROW A NEW WORLD: THE NEW DEAL
COMMUNITY PROGRAM (1959) (giving an account of the New Deal's community building
program and its emphasis on collectivism over individualism).
32. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1988).
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is another example, if we stress the point that its architect
John Collier was himself a sympathetic reader of Peter
Kropotkin's book Mutual Aid.33 Legal pluralism within a
statutory framework also can be seen in the movement which
culminated in the Uniform Commercial Code. The Code is not
federal. It has been enacted uniformly (if not quite identically)
across the state level and contains many pluralist aspects.'
None of this denies the significance of the New Deal's
centralizing influence. It asserts simply that there is an
argument that a commitment to small units continued through
the New Deal itself.
3 5
II. SOME THEORETICAL ALTERNATIVES
In the 1930s, theoretical writings about the state occasionally
included works by writers concerned with the problem of state
intervention in the activities of the small group.36 The presence
33. KENNETH R. PHILP, JOHN COLLIERS CRUSADE FOR INDIAN REFORM 7-8 (1977). For
a discussion of the relevance of Kropotkin's ideas to decentralization, see infra text accom-
panying notes 49-57. John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs from 1933 to 1945,
said:
The Indians and their societies disclose that social heritage is far, far more
perjuring than is commonly believed .... Indeed, this capacity for perdurance
is one of the truths on which the hope of our world rests--our world, grown so pallid
in the last century, and in many regions of life so deathly pallid, through the
totalitarian horror. The sunken stream can flow again, the ravaged desert can
bloom, the great past is not killed. The Indian experience tells us this.
John Collier, United States Indian Administration as a Laboratory of Ethnic Relations,
12 SOC. RES. 265, 302-03 (1945).
34. See Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and
Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 29-30 (1981) (discussing pluralism in the
Uniform Commercial Code).
35. This emphasis on the importance of small units continues. See Gerald E. Frug,
The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1059 (1980) (advocating the granting of
real power to cities); Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution v. The Federalist Empire:
Anti-Federalism from the Attack on "Monarchism" to Modern Localism, 84 Nw. U. L.
REV. 74 (1989) (arguing that, despite the triumph of federalism, Americans do have a
tradition of localism).
36. See, e.g., HAROLD J. LASKI, LIBERTY IN THE MODERN STATE 134-35 (1930) (arguing
in favor of noninterference with the activities of voluntary bodies except where the group's
activity is "intended directly to alter the law, or to arrest the continuity of general social
habits"); Chafee, supra note 27. As noted below, we usually tend to focus much more
on issues relating to individuals as victims or rights-bearers rather than on groups.
For Chafee's recollection of Harold Laski at Harvard, see Note, Laski and the Harvard
Law Review, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1398 (1950).
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of such writers suggests that the theories available in the 1930s
(or today) were not limited to the contributions of the eighteenth-
century antifederalists, but included some treatments that
addressed a recognizably modern world. Moreover, theoretical
discussion did not rely solely on the mainstream English political
ideas and theories of eighteenth-century writers, but also included
political ideas which might have been important later, to a
population which included substantial elements which were not
English.
Peter Kropotkin, the Russian anarchist prince, and Abraham
Kuyper, then leader of the Dutch Anti-Revolutionary Party and
later the country's Prime Minister, both visited America in the
late nineteenth century.3 Their writings help to illustrate two
versions of non-state federalism which could have been familiar
to a hypothetical late nineteenth-century viewer-Erastus Field.
These authors spoke from different, if not opposed, traditions;
one is associated with the left and anarchism,39 the other with
the religious right and conservatism.' What they shared was
a view of the state as one entity among others whose role was
important in relation to smaller units. Both of them saw the
United States as involving this model.
A. Abraham Kuyper
Abraham Kuyper, the Dutch theologian and politician, probably
is remembered less today in the United States than Peter
37. Recognizing such contributions is worth less if methods ofconstitutional interpre-
tation focus solely on the framers' intention. It only becomes important when we think
about constitutional theory as not limited to that question.
38. See PAUL AvRICH, ANARCHIST PORTRAITS 79-106 (discussing Kropotkin's tour of
America); Ex-Dutch Premier, Dr. A. Kuyper, Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1920, at 15
(mentioning Kuyper's lecture tour of the United States).
39. See infra notes 49-57 and accompanying text (discussing Kropotkin).
40. Dirk Jellema concludes his article on Kuyper by saying that Kuyper was the
most notable figure the Netherland's Christian political movement had produced. Dirk
Jellema,Abraham Kuyper's Attack on Liberalism, 19 REV. POL. 472,485 (1957). Jellema
makes it clear that it is difficult to categorize Kuyper. He writes that
[a] good example of the confusion, which that movement has sometimes caused
historians, can be given from Kuyper's career, and can indeed serve as a summary
of that career: in the same year that an English historian dubbed him as a clerical
reactionary, the leader of the Dutch anarchists saluted him as a kindred spirit.
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Kropotkin.4' Dirk Jellema provides a useful introduction to
Kuyper's theoretical approach:
Society is made up of social groups, related organically,
rather than of individuals related impersonally. These
41. Kuyper, who lived from 1837 to 1920, developed his ideas in the context of Dutch
society, a notably pluralistic society structured on the basis of religious and ideological
"pillars." See generally David 0. Moberg, Religion and Society in the Netherlands and
in America, 13 AM. Q. 172, 172 (1961). Moberg suggests that this concept could be
followed in the United States. See id. It may be, in fact, that a study of Dutch society
and its approach to problems of pluralism is important for any student of federalism,
diversity, or tolerance. HAROLD R ISAACS, IDOLS OF THE Thm GROUP IDETY AND POLiCAL
CHANGE 156-57 (1975). It may be that the high point of Dutch pluralism has passed.
See AREND LJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SoCwrm A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION 52 (1977)
(referring to the structure as consociationalism, or "segmented pluralism.").
Kuyper's publications are largely available only in Dutch, though a few of his works
have been translated into English. The commentary on his work often is written from
within the Reformed Church and is published in religiously focused journals. Useful
articles discussing Kuyper in one such journal include James D. Bratt,Abraham Kuyper's
Public Career, REFORMED J., Sept. 1987, at 9, and George Marsden, Where Have All the
Theologians Gone?, REFORMED J., Apr. 1986, at 2. The debate over Kuyper's theology
is detailed in JAMES BRATT, DUTCH CALVINISM IN MODERN AMERICA 14-33 (1984). See
generally James W. Skillen,Introduction to ABRAHAM KUYPER, THE PROBLEM OF POVERTY
9-22 (James W. Skillen ed., 1991) (discussing Kuyper and his ideas); see also POLITICAL
ORDER AND THE PLuRAL STmCIUwR OF SOCIETY 397 (James W. Skiien and Rodkrie M. MoCar
eds., 1991) [hereinafter POLITICAL ORDER] ("At the basis of Kuyper's entire social philosophy
is his faith in the trinitarian God who establishes or casts down, blesses or curses, all
human formative efforts in culture and society."). The tradition of pillarization in the
Netherlands undoubtedly provided a basis for at least one discussion of decentralization
in eduxatma See RoCKNE McCAIRIY Er AL, So(EwY, SEAa & ScHDOL A CASE FuR Sn i IRAL
AND CONFESSIONAL PLURALISM 141-43 (1981) (describing the system of educational pluralism
in the Netherlands).
Ideas of decentralization and pluralist frameworks can take people to different places
when it comes to responding to specific political questions. Those influenced by Kuyper,
for example, went in different directions on the New Deal. For some, Roosevelt's adminis-
tration was understood as an extension of state power into fields better left alone. Bratt
characterizes this as "reactionary Kuyperianism." See BRATT, supra, at 148-49. Another,
'more moderate brand" of Dutch Calvinism tended to see the New Deal more positively,
"approving of its Social Security, collective bargaining, and regulatory measures." Id.
at 149. Still, Bratt concludes, "instinctive wariness of the state balanced every positive
note with a precaution." Id. at 150.
Kuyper was described in The Independent as "the most prominent of Dutch theologians
and... Professor of Hebrew and Dogmatic Theology in the Free University of Amsterdam.
He is also a member of the Dutch Parliament and a leader of the Anti-Revolutionary
Party, as well as editor of its organ, The Daily Standard." Abraham Kuyper, False
Theories of Sovereignty, 50 THE INDEPENDENT 1918 (1898).
Kuyper was in the United States in 1898 in part to receive an honorary degree at
Princeton. The lectures that he gave at that time were published under the title Calvinism.
SeeABRAHAM KUYPER, CALVINISM (1899) (collecting six lectures by Kuyper delivered at
the theological seminary at Princeton). His ideas are of interest here primarily because
of their focus on anti-state sovereignty arguments in a theological context. Kuyper's
emphasis on what he called sphere sovereignty is strikingly parallel to that presented
by other nontheological schools of political thought.
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groups, or spheres, received their sovereignty from God,
not from the state. They are prior to the state. The state
is necessary because of sin, and is due to God's gratia
universalis. The state's function is to serve society; that
is, to serve the social spheres which make up society. This
means that the state's role is to uphold and strengthen
the sovereignty of the social spheres. It has been the
partial destruction of the sovereignty of these social
spheres intermediate between individual and state which
has brought about the present social crisis.
These spheres include, in the narrower sense, such things
as family, town, province, church, school, occupational
groups; and, in the wider sense, such things as science,
literature, art, ideology. The state may not interfere with
the sovereignty of these spheres. Thus it may not interfere
with municipal autonomy, or artistic freedom, or freedom
of conscience, or freedom of speech, or freedom of educa-
tion. A sound theoretical notion of freedom, said Kuyper,
is possible only with a correct view of society, one which
recognizes sphere sovereignty; otherwise there is no
theoretical check on the power of the majority.
Kuyper's social thought thus tends more towards
syndicalism or Guild Socialism than it does towards a
hierarchically organized corporative state. Society is not
arranged vertically but horizontally. The state's task is
to protect the social spheres. This may, of course, mean
extensive state intervention in certain cases, notably when
a social sphere is too weak to exercise its true sovereignty;
then the state must help it become strong. Each sphere
has its own specific sovereignty which it must not go
beyond; if it attempts to, the state must intervene. 42
In addressing the problem of conflict between the spheres
and the issue of government regulation of the spheres, Kuyper
would have authorized state intervention in only three cases:
1. if different spheres should clash, the State government may
compel mutual regard for the boundary lines of each; 2. it may
also intervene to defend individuals in those spheres against
abuse of power by others (e.g. in the case of excessive unem-
ployment, cruelty to a child); 3. it may coerce all spheres to
42. Jellema, supra note 40, at 482-83 (citations omitted).
[VOL. 25:3 & 4
SPRING AND SUMMER 1992]
contribute financially and with whatever means are necessary
to maintain the natural unity of the State.'
Kuyper saw some of the problems, but he also seemed to assume
particular solutions. If, for example, we believed in the "natural
unity" of states, we probably would not be so concerned about
creating institutions to define and preserve that unity. Moreover,
he apparently missed certain issues and some of his work raises
other problems." Thus, James Bratt, in his discussion of Kuyper's
work, raises a "troubling question that Kuyper never resolved."'
The question is, "[w]hat place would the secular have in the re-
formed nation? How could Kuyper simultaneously assert, as he
did, pluralistic tolerance and spiritualized politics?"' Bratt also
suggests that Kuyper's assumption that "a high degree of harmony
and equity naturally existed among [the spheres]" is problematic.47
It also has been noted that "Kuyper's political philosophy does not
grow and deepen to the point where he is able to elaborate the
notion of public justice as the norm of state life.""
B. Peter Kropotkin
The pluralist vision and the detailed questions it raises are
visible again when we look at the ideas of Peter Kropotkin.4
43. Anthony H. Nichols, The Educational Doctrines of Abraham Kuyper: An
Evaluation, J. CHRISTIAN EDUC., Aug. 1975, at 26, 35 (1975).
44. See generally Ivo Schaffer, Abraham Kuyper and the Jews, in DUTCH JEWISH
HISTORY 237 (1984); Ivo Schoffer, The Jews in the Netherlands: The Positionofa Minority
Through Three Centuries, 15 STUDIA ROSENTHALIANA 85, 97-98 (1981). Sch6ffer refers
to Kuyper as "the founder of the Calvinist 'pillar'" and notes that Kuyper "would have
preferred the Jews to retire within their close community also, sacrificing so to speak
what he considered their wrong-headed emancipation." Id. at 97.
45. BRATT, supra note 41, at 26.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. POLITICAL ORDER, supra note 41, at 402 (noting that while Kuyper sees that the
"government's task is to protect confessionaland societal pluralism," the meaningofpublic
justice is loose and ambiguous).
49. Prince Peter Kropotkin was born in Moscow in 1842 to a Russian aristocratic
family. He worked as a geologist and zoologist, developing in the course of his
investigations a critical perspective on Darwinian theory which is reflected in his book
Mutual Aid. See Ashley Montagu, Foreword to PETER KROPOTKEN, MUTUAL AID (1955).
In that book Kropotkin stated:
[N]either the crushing powers of the centralized State nor the teachings of mutual
hatred and pitiless struggle which came, adorned with the attributes of science,
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Kropotkin outlined one version of his view of federalism in his
autobiography, Memoirs of a Revolutionist.'0 Kropotkin wrote:
We saw that a new form of society is germinating in the
civilized nations, and must take the place of the old one ....
This society will be composed of a multitude of associations,
federated for all the purposes which require federation: trade
federations for production of all sorts, - agricultural,
industrial, intellectual, artistic; communes for consumption,
making provision for dwellings, gas works, supplies of food,
sanitary arrangements, etc.; federations of communes among
themselves, and federations of communes with trade
organizations; and finally, wider groups covering all the
country, or several countries, composed of men who
collaborate for the satisfaction of such economic, intellectual,
artistic, and moral needs as are not limited to a given
territory. All these will combine directly, by means of free
agreements between them .... There will be full freedom
for the development of new forms of production, invention,
and organization; individual initiative will be encouraged,
and the tendency toward uniformity and centralization will
be discouraged. Moreover, this society will not be crystallized
into certain unchangeable forms, but will continually modify
its aspect, because it will be a living, evolving organism; no
need of government will be felt, because free agreement and
federation take its place in all those functions which govern-
ments consider as theirs at the present time, and because,
the causes of conflict being reduced in number, those conflicts
which may still arise can be submitted to arbitration.5
Kropotkin's ideas, and those of anarchism generally, always
have been associated with a no-government position. But
from obliging philosophers and sociologists, could weed out the feeling of human
solidarity, deeply lodged in men's understanding and heart, because it has been
nurtured by all our preceding evolution.
Id. at 292. In the course of his career as a philosophical anarchist, Kroptkin was arrested
and imprisoned several times. He spent many years living in Europe and England and
made two visits to the United States. After the 1917 revolution, the Kropotkin family
returned to Russia, where Peter Kropotkin died in 1921. Id. at Foreword.
50. PETR KROpmON, MEMOrS OF A REvoLmoNisr (196%)l.a Kmx s Memom orginally
were published in The Atlantic Monthly. See Peter Kropotkin, The Autobiography of
a Revolutionist, 82 ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1898, at 346 through 84 ATLANTIc MONTHLY,
Sept. 1899, at 410. The forum suggests a general audience.
51. KROPOTKIN, supra note 50, at 398-99.
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Kropotkin's ideas lead quite naturally to an emphasis not only
on no-government, but also on limited government' and on decen-
tralization and communitarianism. In this respect, Kropotkin
can be associated with movements ranging from guild socialism
to syndicalism, which saw the state's role as providing a
framework within which group life would be possible.
53
Kropotkin summarized his general position in a speech he gave
in the United States, in which he declared that mankind's
progress "points in the direction of less government of man by
man, of more liberty for the individual, of freer scope for the
development of all individual faculties, for the greatest develop-
ment of the initiative of the individual, for home rule for every
separate unit, and for decentralization of power. " '4 Kropotkin
also said,
I am a strong federalist,... and I think that even under
the present conditions the functions of government could be
with great advantage decentralized territorially. Your theory
of home rule in America I consider a distinct step in advance
of the European centralized state, and it ought to continue
in all directions.55
Here, as with Kuyper, critics have raised questions. E.V.
Zenker argued in his book on anarchism that Kropotkin was
essentially deceived as to human nature, particularly as to his
notion of a universal feeling of solidarity.56 Specifically addressing
the point under discussion here, Camillo Berneri warned that
Kropotkin's theory suffers because it is "not too much concerned
with the dangers inherent in the autonomy of small groups."57
52. These issues arise in Pierre Proudhon's work as well. See Richard Vernon,
Introduction to PIM JOSEPH PROUDHON, THE PRINCIP E OF FEDERATION at d, xiv-xvi (Richard
Vernon trans., 1979) (noting the conflict between Proudhon's ideas of anarchism and
federalism). See generally ALAN RrrER, THE PorICAL THOUGir OF Pm -JOSEPH PROUDHON
155-60 (1969) (discussing Proudhon's theory of federalism as a view of minimal
government).
53. For an account ofKropotkin, see AVRICH, supra note 38, at 53-106. Thanks also
to Ya'Avoc Oved for providing me with a copy of his article, Ya'Avoc Oved, The Future
Society According to Kropotkin (Hana Lash trans., 1991) (translation on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
54. AVRICH, supra note 38, at 87-88.
55. Id. at 85.
56. E.V. ZENKER, ANARCHISM 178-80 (1897).
57. C. BERNERI, PETER KROPOTKIN: HIS FEDERALIST IDEAS 9 (1943).
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III. PRACTICAL TESTS: OVERVIEW
The difficulties with pluralist theories are familiar.' Critics
of such theories regularly indicate points of uncertainty about
these ideas, 9 and those who have seen practical attempts have
noted how many questions about pluralism remain unan-
swered.6 °
One of the many contexts in which these issues are high-
lighted today in the United States is in the Amish practice of
"shunning." Shunning provides a particularly appropriate
context for examining the difficulties involved in pluralist
theories because, although shunning sometimes is seen simply
as a bad practice, it widely is understood as the sanctioning
system on which the Amish community depends.61 Shunning
58. The difficulties vary, of course, depending on the particular pluralist theory being
discussed. Sometimes they relate to the fairness of the competition between groups for
the favor of government (a common criticism of interest group pluralism) or to the problem
of how groups are created in the first place. Sometimes difficulties are raised concerning
the primary ambiguity over the amount of coercion which the central authority is
understood to exercise over the groups. This is the concern here.
59. For example, one might note here Mark Tushnet's comments on Robert Cover's
pluralist theory. See Mark V. Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory,
83 MICH. L. REv. 1502, 1527-31 (1985).
60. See eg., JACOB ROBINSON Er AL, WERE THE MINORITIEs ThFA=E A FA11WEE 68 (1943)
(raising various questions concerning state control and education that still remained
under the system of the Minorities Treaties).
61. John A. Hostetler and Gertrude E. Huntington describe Amish shunning as
follows:
Excommunication and shunning (Bann and Meidung) are the church-community's
means of dealing with obdurate and erring members and of keeping the church
pure. How shunning should be practiced was the central question in the controversy
that led the Amish to secede from the Swiss Brethren. The doctrine was intrinsic
in the Anabaptist movement from its very beginning. The Anabaptist concept of
the church was of a pure church consisting of believers only; persons who violate
the discipline must first be excommunicated, then shunned. This method of dealing
with offenders, the Amish say, is taught by Christ (Matthew 18:15-17), and
explained by the Apostle Paul (I Corinthians 5:11) that members must not keep
company with unrepentant members nor eat with them. The passage is interpreted
to mean that a person who has broken his vow with God and who will not mend
his ways must be expelled from the fellowship just as the human body casts off
an infectious growth. The practice of shunning among the Swiss Mennonites was
to exclude the offender from communion. A more emphatic practice was advanced
by Jacob Amman. His interpretation required shunning excommunicated persons
not only at communion but also in social and economic life. Shunning means that
members may receive no favors from an excommunicated person, that they may
not buy from or sell to an excommunicated person, and that no member shall eat
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is unlike the many issues which create tensions between groups
and the state because the group practice is different. Familiar
examples of such issues are controversies over medical care
or education. On the contrary, shunning, as a group practice,
can be viewed as similar to the practices of other groups or,
indeed, of the state itself. That is, we can construe expulsion
and exclusions, outlawing, incarceration, and even capital
punishment as forms of avoidance (or shunning).62 The point
here is that shunning is a practice which in large part defines
the group. It is a prime mechanism, in addition to group
education and religious ritual, through which the "we" which
constitutes the group is maintained.
In general "we" belong to many groups, so that the term "we"
has a shifting reference. These groups-"intermediate
groups"'-are often understood to play a significant role in
life. Sometimes the role the intermediate groups play is
attacked as a form of private government.' Sometimes the
groups are seen as establishing normative codes to which
individuals choose to be committed. The point here is that
there are many groups, although the focus at any point in time
will tend to be on one. Chester Barnard illustrated this multi-
plicity of association by describing a "typical" citizen: "Mr.
A, a citizen of Massachusetts, a member of the Baptist Church,
having a father and mother living, and a wife and two children,
is an expert machinist employed at a pump station of an
important water system."' Barnard makes it clear, though,
at the same table with an excommunicated person. If the person under the ban
is a husband or wife, the couple is to suspend their marital relations until the erring
member is restored to the church fellowship.
JOHN A- HoSTErLER & GERTRUDE E. HUNTINGTON, CHILDREN IN AMISH SOCIETY 6-7 (1971).
62. Eugen Ehrlich wrote, "All of us then are living within numberless, more or less
compactly, occasionally quite loosely, organized associations, and our fate in life will,
in the main, be conditioned by the kind of position we are able to achieve within them."
EUGEN EHRucH, FUNDAmENTAL PRINCniPS OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 63 (Walter L Moll -ams,
1962). Ehrlich identified exclusion and avoidance as the source of coercive power
generally. Id. at 63-64.
63. The term "intermediate groups" refers to those various groups to which an
individual may belong. These groups are conceptually intermediate between the individual
and the state. Some groups extend over many states.
64. See generally CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY 241-312 (Warren J. Samuels & Arthur
S. Miller eds., 1987) (including essays on the issue of the corporation as a private
government); see also Stewart Macaulay, Private Government, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 445 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986).
65. CHESTER I. BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE 267 (1966).
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that these were only some identifications among many others
that Mr. A might have:
We impute to him several moral codes: Christian ethics,
the patriotic code of the citizen, a code of family obliga-
tions, a code as an expert machinist, a code derived from
the organization engaged in the operation of the water
system. He is not aware of these codes. These intellectual
abstractions are a part of his "system," ingrained in him
by causes, forces, experiences, which he has either forgot-
ten or on the whole never recognized. Just what they are,
in fact, can at best only be approximately inferred by his
actions, preferably under stress. He has no idea as to the
order of importance of these codes, although, if pressed,
what he might say probably would indicate that his
religious code is first in importance, either because he has
some intellectual comprehension of it, or because it is
socially dominant. I shall hazard the guess, however, that
their order of importance is as follows: his code as to the
support and protection of his own children, his code of
obligations to the water system, his code as a skilled
artisan, his code with reference to his parents, his religious
code, and his code as a citizen .... It not only takes
extraordinary pressure to make him violate any of his
codes, but when faced with such pressure he makes great
effort to find some solution that is compatible with all of
them; and because he makes that effort and is capable he
has in the past succeeded."
Sometimes, however, the codes do not fit together. In such
cases, some group will find that its norm has been violated and
that group will respond. Amish shunning cases involve the sorts
of tensions to which Barnard refers. An Amish individual may
be an American, Amishman, father, husband, farmer. At one
moment these codes fit, and then suddenly they do not.
A particularly difficult problem arises when the group disci-
plines an individual member for breaking its code in a manner
that ordinarily would be a basis for civil liability in the state
system. In such a case the individual first must decide whether
or not to seek help from the state. 7 In response, the state then
66. Id. at 267-68.
67. Some groups and some individuals will neither litigate nor defend in the state
system.
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must decide whether to intervene, recognizing that not
intervening also is taking a substantive position.
A typical shunning case that includes state intervention
would involve an individual who is shunned by the community
as a sanction after withdrawing or being expelled from it, and
who then sues the community in tort.' Although recent cases
of this type have involved an individual's relations with groups
that are primarily religious, individuals, in theory, also could
raise tort claims in response to discipline by secular groups. 9
An individual might base such a claim for avoidance on a
theory of conspiracy to boycott, alienation of affections,
defamation, or tortious interference with contract. The claim
also might allege malice. The community's defense (if it is a
religious community) typically would be that the shunning was
a religious practice protected by federal and state constitutions.
Any community also might raise a common-law tort defense
arguing that the behavior, if tortious, was privileged.
Religious groups provide a particularly useful context for
addressing questions about pluralism because the issues raised
by their interaction with the state are presented so clearly.
I am less interested here in the legal categories in which these
problems are discussed (that is, tort, contract, First Amend-
ment) than in the issues which underlie those categories.
Because shunning involves the conflict of two legal systems,
it tests and defines our commitment to pluralism and diversity.
Because these cases suggest that the state's power is limited
by the group's ability simply to refuse to comply with any court
order, the cases highlight the limits of law.
68. A well-known example of such a case is Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church,
in which Robert Bear brought suit against the Reformed Mennonites, following his
excommunication from and shunning by the community. 341 A.2d 105, 106 (Pa. 1975).
Bear claimed that the shunning resulted in tortious interference with a business rela-
tionship and alienation of his family's affections. Id. at 106-07. The Reformed Mennonites
argued that they had a complete defense in the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment. Id. at 107. The lower court accepted this defense but the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court rejected it and remanded the case for trial. Id. at 108. The conflict between Robert
Bear and the Reformed Mennonites continued in various legal forums, including a federal
case that was dismissed in 1986. "Shunned" Mennonite Loses Another Court Battle, UPI,
Feb. 28, 1986 (LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI file). For further discussion of Bear, see text
accompanying notes 97-98.
For general discussions of shunning see John A. Hostetler, The Amish and the Law:
A Religious Minority and Its Legal Encounters, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 33,36-40 (1984);
Justin K Miller, Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don't: Religious Shunning and the
Free Exercise Clause, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 271 (1988); John H. Yoder, Caesar and the
Meidung, 23 MENNONrTE Q. REV. 76 (1949).
For a discussion of problems arising out of contract cases involving ex-members of
19th-century utopian aommunities, see CAROL WEISBROD, THE BOUNDARIES OF UTOPIA (1980).
69. Various sorts of exclusions from trade unions and professional associations might
provide an example.
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We begin with the assumption that a crime is not excused
even when described as a group sanction. For example, the
state forbids private executions, whether as a family sanction 0
or a group sanction. The state similarly forbids private
incarceration.7v
The case that I will use (with some interpolations from other
cases) to explore the issues raised thus far is Yoder v. Helmuth,
decided in Ohio in 1947.72 Although it did not result in an
70. See Missouri Couple Sentenced to Die in Murder of Their Daughter, 16, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 1991, at A33 (reporting the conviction offumdamentalist Muslim parents
for killing their rebellious teenage daughter).
71. Thus, we are as surprised as Charles Merriam when he describes the university
jail at the University of Berlin, the "academic hoosegow" in which Bismarck and others
were held. CHARLES E. MERRIAM, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 2 n.3 (1944). "This was
a revelation to me," Merriam writes, "for in my day the school authorities could throw
a man out but they could not throw him in." Id.
Merriam's image of a university jail evokes the world of legal pluralism, in which
multiple authorities operate within parallel systems of rules and sanctions. In the age
of the modern state, the world of legal pluralism is a difficult world to keep in focus.
Our idea of law is monist: one authority, one set of rules. This is particularly true to
the extent that our sense of law is dominated by ideas about the criminal law. Criminal
law in general is not a major source of ideas of legal pluralism, whether these ideas take
the form ofclaims of religious exemption, local or customary law, or the so-called "cultural
defense." Criminal law seems to be more associated with ideas of the unity of law-law
indifferent to persons, law rooted in a sense of impersonal justice-ideas which go deeply
to our sense of what the rule of law in the modern state is about. Similarly, we are largely
committed to the idea that the State has a monopoly on the use of violence.
At the same time, in some other significant contexts, most obviously contracts and
commercial law, we acknowledge that pluralism is intrinsic to the subject. Contracts
are exactly about the law of the individual parties; commercial law is filled with references
to the custom of the trade. In recent times-though not historically-we have seen the
field of domestic relations move from the criminal law model, in which the state had
a single conception of the good family and the good life, to a contracts model, in which
the law provides a fairly open framework for individual choices. These fields are inheritors
of the tradition of decentralization and of a pluralist view of the social structure as a
whole.
Torts are somehow in the middle. Torts are, to begin with, civil wrongs which are
conceived as private rather than public. Torts, at the same time, have a strong public
aspect. Leon Green has said, "'We the People' are a party to every lawsuit and it is our
interest that weighs most heavily in its determination." Leon Green, Tort Law Public
Law in Disguise, in THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW 115, 115 (2d ed. 1977). Tort
actions often, if not always, have, or have had, an analogue on the criminal law side.
The field as understood currently, is, in its nature, fluid and concerned with the balancing
of interests rather than, it seems, the application of rules.
72. Yoder v. Helmuth, No. 35747 (Ohio C.P. Wayne County Nov. 7, 1947) (relevant
case documents on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Material
on Yoder v. Helmuth has been provided to me by the Mennonite Historical Library at
Goshen College, Goshen, Indiana, andbythe Wayne County Common Pleas Court, Wayne
County, Ohio. I appreciate the courtesy of both of these institutions. The case is
unreported but extensively desibed in WILLIAM 1. SCHREIBER, OUR AMISH NEIGHBORS 97-117
(1962) and in Yoder, supra note 68. See also Note, The Right Not to Be Modern Men:
The Amish and Compulsory Education, 53 VA. L. REV. 925, 936 (1967). See generally
JOHN A. HOSTETLER, AMISH SOCIETY (rev. ed. 1968). Note that issues of shunning or dis-
fellowship can arise also in conventional custody cases. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson,
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elaborate judicial discussion, the facts of the case are
particularly useful for present purposes, first because the
plaintiff said that he was no longer a member of the group
which shunned him, and second because the case, which was
not appealed, resulted in the award of damages and an
injunction directed against the shunning.73
IV. ESSENTIAL FEDERALISM IN ACTION
Imagine the Monumental federalism depicted in Erastus
Field's painting with a new inset picture, a photograph taken
in 1947 in an Ohio courtroom-in fact an Associated Press
picture of Andrew Yoder in court, published in Time Maga-
zine.74 Four of the defendant Amishmen sit around a table in
an identical posture, each resting his head on his hand, all
looking at each other. In the background, a number of
spectators talk to each other and watch the proceeding. A
photograph of Yoder himself has been superimposed on the
center bottom of the picture, placed by the photographer in
such a way as to reinforce the alienation of the individual from
the group. The caption reads: "Andrew Yoder (center) &
Fellow-Amishmen: The plain people called it pride."75
Wherever Andrew Yoder was when this photograph of the
courtroom was taken, the photographers and composite people
from Time obviously believed that the individual was the center
of this story. His oppressors surround him and the public
surrounds them, all within the walls of the courtroom.
Contrasts between the Field painting and the trial photo-
graph initially may seem obvious. One is a work of the
intellect and imagination, the other a photograph.76 One
stresses conventionally important public events and shows
almost faceless human figures often set in perfectly aligned
564 P.2d 71, 76 (Alaska 1977) (holding that liberal visitation rights would overcome the
access problems of a non-custodial father who had been disfellowshipped by the Jehovah's
Witnesses), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1048 (1978). See generally Carl E. Schneider, Religion
and Child Custody, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 879 (1992) (exploring the ways courts may
consider a parent's religiously motivated behavior in making child-custody decisions).
73. Plaintiffs Petition at 1; Journal Entry at 1; Court's Finding at 204-05.
74. The Mited Man, TIME, Nov. 17, 1947, at 26.
75. Id.
76. On the Amish rejection ofphotographs, see DONALD B. KRAYBILL, THE RIDDLE OF
AMISH CULTURE 34 (1989).
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rows. The other tells a story about the plain people, four
individuals surrounded by other individuals, faces clear and
marked. One can be seen as a kind of federalist plan which
remains unrealized, the other might be said to represent the
actual sociological truth of the real world.
But the contrast between the two pictures is not as strong as
initially might be thought. Field, like the creators of the compos-
ite photograph, depicted historical materials and events-creating
a particular view of reality through his juxtaposition of these
literally representational scenes. Further, ideology too is real
and may be depicted in constructed photographs as well as in
an imagined ziggarut. There are similarities, but the pictures
present important contrasts nonetheless.
Perhaps the photograph is best understood as a final
hypothetical detail on Field's central tower. If we imagine the
inclusion of the photograph in the Field painting, we reinforce
the human dimension of federalism and the relationship among
individuals, groups, and the state which is at its center.
A. Another Yoder Case
77
Our images of traditional societies often involve monoliths.
It is clear, however, that even in such societies there are internal
differentiations, which sometimes rise to the level of splits and
separations. Andrew Yoder had been a member of a conservative
Amish group, the old order of the Amish Mennonite Church. Dis-
agreeing with them over several matters (including his need of
a car to get a sick child to medical treatment) he left the
conservative group's church for that of a more liberal group.7"
He then was shunned by his first group.79 He felt, he said, "like
a whippped [sic] dog."' Yoder brought suit and alleged that the
77. The reference is, of course, to Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), a case
which is remembered for its powerful vindication of Amish values and social structures.
But as even that case indicated, there are other aspects of Amish life with which we are
less comfortable. See Marie R. Deveney, Courts and Cultural Distinctiveness, 25 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 867 (1992).
78. Plaintiffs Petition at 1-2. Yoder argued that he had not been expelled. Id. at
3. The church version of the events spoke of an expulsion. Defendant's Answer at 1.
79. Plaintiffs Petition at 1-2. For more discussion on the practice of shunning, see
supra note 61 and accompanying text.
80. Wins Ostracism Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1947, at 2.
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defendants "wilfully, intentionally and maliciously entered into
a secret combination and conspiracy" to boycott him in accordance
with the rules of the old order of the Amish Mennonite Church."1
William Schreiber gives an account of the proceedings in Our
Amish Neighbors, quoted here at length:
The "Meidung"-mite, avoidance, shunning, boycott-had
been in effect for about five years in 1947. Yoder charged
in court that the purpose of the "Meidung" was to compel
him "to submit to church officials [sic] in the management
of his trade, religious and business affairs, and it excluded
[sic] him from all social and business relations with the
members of said church by persuasion and intimidation."
His own brother had been requested to boycott and avoid
him and to have no dealings with him and had been told that
his refusal to do so would place him, the brother, under the
ban and make him also an object of the boycott. More than
that, Yoder declared, the church authorities had approached
his father to demand he remove him, Andy, from the farm
which he had been operating under lease.
Yoder listed other injurious instances of the application
of the "Meidung": at farm sales old friends would speak, but
then actually shun his company; at one funeral he had been
forced to eat under an apple tree while the others had dined
in the house; at another a farm hand had requested Andy
to eat at a separate table in a corner of the room; at various
threshings he had been made to eat in the cellar. Worst of
all, and here the boycott had showed its ugliest side, he had
not been able to obtain help for his own harvesting opera-
tions, and the men he did get to help him were likewise
banned from the church.
Andy J. Yoder summed up the reasons for leaving the
Old Order Amish church in this way: (1) he had needed an
automobile to afford transportation and to facilitate his
farming operations; (2) he had needed transportation to
Wooster, fifteen miles distant, so that his daughter,
crippled with polio, might have treatments; (3) he had been
opposed to the rule of his church which prohibited male
members from wearing rubber suspenders; (4) he had been
against the boycott rule; (5) he had believed that he, too,
had a natural and indefeasible right to worship God
81. Plaintiffs Petition at 2.
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according to the dictates of his own conscience. Yoder
estimated that the damage to him in the injury of his own
health and in isolation from society had amounted to some
$40,000. He had also asked the court that the defendants
be immediately enjoined from continuing the boycott.8 2
Yoder's general claim was that the boycott violated his civil
rights.' The judge's charge to the jury also framed the
question in terms of Yoder's civil rights:
The law gives to each and every individual the right to
believe and belong to any Church that he chooses, or to no
Church, if he so chooses. And no church or its ruling body
has the right, under the law, to deny any of its members
these rights, including the right, if he so chooses, to with-
draw from membership in the Church.84
The judge also referred to the action/belief dichotomy, familiar
in discussions of religious exemptions from valid state laws:
"When one puts his religious belief into practice and thereby
interferes with the civil rights of another it is unlawful."'
The charge to the jury continued with an argument to the
effect that there can be no acquiescence to evil acts, even when
performed by religious groups. "Sincerity of religious belief...
is no valid legal excuse to deny anyone his guaranteed human
rights."8 The judge concluded that
under the right of freedom of religious worship, the Plaintiff
had a legal right to withdraw from the Helmuth Congregation
and to buy an automobile if he so chose, and not to be disci-
plined .... He also had the legal right to freely enjoy the
82. SCHREIBER, supra note 72, at 98-99 (quoting Plaintiff's Petition at 3).
83. See Plaintiffs Petition at 6-7; Charge to the Jury at 189-90; see also Charles
E. Westervelt, Jr., Torts-Disciplinary Action by Religious Society as Infringement of
Civil Liberty, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 370, 370 (1948). Westervelt approved of the granting of
the injunction in these terms: "Under no circumstances can a religious group be
permitted to resort to concerted action in derogation of an individual's civil rights. It
seems evident that the 'mite' was an intentional and coercive interference with the
plaintiffs right to be unmolested in business and society, and was, therefore, properly
enjoined." Id. at 71.
84. Charge to the Jury at 196.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 197.
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relationship of his entire family and the freedom of business
intercourse unrestricted by any unlawful restraints thereon
87
The jury awarded damages, but only a portion of those
requested.8 Schreiber writes that "[t]he verdict was not
appealed, but neither were steps taken to comply with the court
order." 9 As a result, some Amish property was sold, though
some of the award was paid by an unknown third party.9° The
judge also issued an injunction against the defendants, ordering
them to stop their boycott of Yoder.9
As noted above, this case and others like it raise a general
question whether such state interventions into individual/group
relations serve the function of state dispute settlement or whether
they are examples of what Charles Merriam referred to as the
"poverty of power." 2 The controversy in Yoder clearly continued
after the law had spoken, and those watching the case knew that
the court order was not the end of the story. An article in Time
magazine noted that "[Yoder] would be permitted to worship in
an Amish Church but he would have no voice in the church or
be admitted to communion."93 The article concluded that "[tlo
the stubborn Amishmen, who frown upon court actions, God's
law came before that of men. Andrew would still be under a mite
of a mite."9 A Newsweek article commented that while the
judgment would not be appealed, "[t]he Amish have their own
ways of meeting such auslander edicts."95
87. Id. at 198-99. The charge to the jury did not reach such issues as admission
to communion.
88. Journal Entry at 1 (jury's verdict on damages); see also SCHREIBER, supra note
72, at 111.
89. SCHREIBER, supra note 72, at 113.
90. Id. at 113-14. Schreiber mentions reports that the third party was a prominent
businessman who had extensive business dealings with the Amish. Id. at 115. But one
commentator notes:
The consequences of this interference with a religious practice were truly tragic.
One of the ministers against whom the judgment was rendered lost his farm at
a forced sale to provide money to satisfy the judgment. He subsequently died, his
wife claims, of a broken heart. Andy Yoder's daughter died shortly after the trial,
and Andy Yoder hung himself.
Note, supra note 72, at 936 n.62.
91. Court's Finding at 204-05.
92. Charles E. Merriam, Political Power, in A STUDY OF POWER 156-83 (1934).
93. The Mited Man, supra note 74, at 26.
94. Id.
95. TheAmish 'Mite', NEWSWEEK, Nov. 17,1947, at 30; see also Wins Ostracism Suit,
supra note 80, at 2.
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Yoder demonstrates that while there are few cases on shunning,
the state-centered system seems at times more inclined to react
for a victimized member of a group and against the particular
intermediate community. A non-Amish jury found for the victim
in the 1947 Yoder case, and the judge gave priority to the
individual's right against the group, noting that he believed that
this matter of religious freedom is an individual matter.' The.
shunning improperly burdened the individual's right to leave the
group.
A ruling in favor of the shunned member, or former member- a
distinction to which I will return-is not, however, inevitable.
This is an area in which many rules exist, and a great deal of
legal language is available. But as is true in any complex case,
the rules and the language do not dictate a single answer.
One approach might be to say that the larger state should defer
to the community on this issue, either on the theory of a free-
exercise defense or on the theory that according to common-law
tort approaches, the behavior was privileged. This was the
position of the lower court in Bear v. Reformed Mennonite
Church,97 another shunning case:
The short answer to Plaintiffs averments of injury to his
business and marital interest would be, in light of the
foregoing, a summary a fortiori dismissal. More considered
analysis reveals that the fatal defect of Plaintiffs allegations
is the fact of privilege, the presence of which will bar a cause
of action for [inter alia] interference with business relations
With respect to Plaintiffs allegation of interference with
business relations, it is determinative that Defendants' "shun-
ning," as a religious practice, has for its partial purpose
maintenance of Defendant Church's spiritual integrity ....
Likewise, it is dispositive of Plaintiff s allegation of alienation
of affections that the practice of "shunning" is within the
constitutional immunity afforded by the First Amendment
98
We could reinforce this conclusion by referring to contract law
concepts. We could say that the member, in exercising his
96. SCHREIBER, supra note 72, at 112-13.
97. 24 CUMBERLAND L.J. 168 (June 1973), rev'd, 341 A-2d 105 (Pa. 1975).
98. Bear, 24 CUMBERLAND L.J. at 172.
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freedom of religion, knowingly joined a church that used shunning
as a sanction and was now subject to that sanction. John Howard
Yoder put the argument this way: "[I]n contractual terms,
Andrew Yoder was suing the church for consistently applying
a forfeiture clause in a contract which he had freely made (in
awareness of the existence of a forfeiture clause) and had
intentionally broken." "
We thus can consider the individual who is subjected to disci-
pline as a member of the smaller community without the right
to appeal to the larger authority. We might decide to do this
because we believe it effectuates individual's choices, because
it strengthens intermediate communities' power against the state,
and/or because we believe that the state's intervention here would
not be effective.
Alternatively, we could advocate legal relief for the individual
on the theory that she had rights as a member of the larger
community, that these rights had been infringed by a group
claiming greater power than it was entitled to, and that the
interests of the larger community require protection of the
individual. This concern for state interests is revealed in the
position of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Bear:
In our opinion, the complaint, in Counts I and II, raises
issues that the "shunning" practice of appellee church and
the conduct of the individuals may be an excessive interfer-
ence within areas of "paramount state concern," i.e. the
maintenance of marriage and family relationship, alienation
of affection, and the tortious interference with a business
relationship, which the courts of this Commonwealth may
have authority to regulate, even in light of the "Establish-
ment" and "Free Exercise" clauses of the First Amendment.100
We may take this position because we believe that the tyranny
of small groups is more intense and dangerous than the tyranny
of large ones, or because we are not sympathetic to the particular
99. Yoder, supra note 68, at 88.
100. Bear, 341 A.2d at 107. John Noonan labeled the issue in Bear as "Preserving
the Purity of the Membership." See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR, THE BELEVER AND THE POWERS
THAT ARE 288 (1987). In sociological terms, this issue relates to questions of deviance
and community self-definition. See generally KAI T. ERICKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS: A
STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 3-25 (1966) (discussing the proposition that deviant
behaviour may be a necessary element in the definition of society as well as an important
element in the long-term development of society, RI. MOORE, THE FORMATION OF A PERSECUT-
ING SOCIETY 106-12 (1987) (examining the history of persecution in Western Europe in
relation to general deviance theory).
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group and assume that a person victimized by it must be
protected. This could be true whether or not we are sympathetic
to the individual victim. 10'
In contrast to the positive image of the Amish presented by
the court in Wisconsin v. Yoder, an Ohio Court treating an Amish
shunning problem wrote in 1913 of the "strange and peculiar sect
composed of Low Germans [which] 397 years ago construed
portions of the Bible as shown by Art. 16 of the Amish Confession
of Faith.""°2 The Ohio court was not impressed with the group's
history:
Some things become more precious by age, but the crude and
unnatural conceptions as disclosed are in sharp conflict with
modern legal civil rights, which tend to infringe upon
inherent family and business life, and which harmonizes
better with the views of his Satanic Majesty and his satellites
or representatives on earth. Of course courts have nothing
to do with men's religious views howsoever antiquated, except
when such acts infringe civil right; all we need to state is
that no religious views can be the means of infringing civil
rights. 103
On the basis of this negative view of a particular intermediate
group, the larger culture may be unsympathetic to many religious
groups that use strong forms of shunning because of the groups'
commitment to "unusual" religious beliefs and social forms, and
because of the groups' willingness to engage in social ostracism
to the extent of even rejecting family members.
But even if the outside world is sympathetic to the victim rather
than the group, does this mean that the State should intervene?
What other possibilities are there? Are there cases in which we
expect a certain amount of self-help from the victim? This
position is illustrated by a contemporary comment on the 1947
Yoder case in the journal United Evangelical Action, in which
the writer stressed that Andrew Yoder had a remedy:
Yoder could, with ease, move a bare mile away and then have
dealings to his heart's content with other farmers. Likewise,
101. Of course there is no reason to assume that the victim in a shunning case is
fighting for democratic principles or for a more open society. Although he may be doing
precisely that, it is equally possible that the person shunned is denouncing the group
for having deviated from the true faith.
102. Ginerich v. Swartzentruber, 22 Ohio N. P. (n.s.) 2, 16 (1913).
103. Id; sw a/so ZHARAH CHAFEE JR & EDWARD D. RE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUITY
1221-22 (1958) (using Ginerich among illustrative cases dealing with equitable
intervention).
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he could easily have all business dealings with non-Amish
if he so chose. Instead, Yoder insists on living within a
communal body which he himself does not advocate. Horace
Greeley would say, "Go West; young man, go West." °4
Historically, excommunication from a small community could
be described in terms of prison and fetters,'0 5 rather than as a
merely psychological restraint, perhaps because one could not
leave the physical environment for another community easily,
or at least not without a letter of identification and a good
character. But what if one could leave? The notions of
decentralized pluralism and voluntary association assume that
people can pass freely into and out of communities.'0° We
generally assume that the "exit" option cannot be eliminated
altogether, 107 but question how heavily it can be burdened. The
practice of shunning or excommunication is, after all, designed
in part to keep people in or to restore them to communion.
Sometimes leaving the group or the jurisdiction is not an
effective remedy. For example, what if a church not only
shuns-typically described as passive behavior-but actively
denounces and defames? A church might do this either on the
theory that it was disciplining a present member for the
104. Ford Berg, The Other Side ofthe Yoder Suit, UNITED EVANGELICAL ACTION, Dec.
1, 1947, at 7, 7. For a discussion of what effectively amounts to "exit," see Frederick
M. Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 Wis.
L. REV. 99, 155 n.252 (comparing the burden on individuals of securing another job with
the burden on the church of state intervention). On "exit" generally, see ALBERT 0.
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
105. See Yosef Kaplan, The Social Functions of the Herem in the Portuguese Jewish
Community of Amsterdam in the Seventeenth Century, in DUTCH JEWISH HISTORY 111, 115
(Jozeph Michman ed., 1984) (describing excommunication as "[a] prison without bars"
or "iron fetters which the eye cannot see but which the body feels very strongly." (citations
omitted)). This discussion suggests the importance of what one exits into. That is, does
the largest group require membership in some internal subgroup or is it possible to be,
in effect, a citizen of the world? What happens when no other group will accept an
individual who must be a member of some group and who has been excluded from his
original group? This is part of the meaning of outlawry.
106. Whether they can enter communities is a separate issue, complicated by our
expanding conceptions of impermissible discriminations.
107. This reaches the issue of voluntary slavery. See James Crawford, The Rights
of Peoples: Some Conclusions, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES, supra note 28, at 159 (raising
the question "Should individual rights, including the right to opt out of groups or commu-
nities, prevail over the interests of those groups or communities?"). Crawford also notes
that "[tihe crucial issue is that of'minorities of minorities': ifminority rights are genuinely
collective, then it presumably follows that dissenting members of minority groups can
be compelled to comply with the wishes of the majority." James Crawford, The Rights
of Peoples: "Peoples" or "Governments'?, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES, supra note 28, at 55,
60.
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(ultimate) good of the member or for the good of the others,
who observe and are fortified by the example.
If a church takes the position that one cannot renounce
membership and that, therefore, jurisdiction over members
is perpetual, what position should the State take? From a
contract perspective, much might depend on whether the
individual, in joining the church, knew of the group's position
on the issue or of how severe the sanctions were. Clearly,
whether the church declares eternal membership is not the
end of the issue. It may be that religious groups see them-
selves as units that one can join but not leave. But one can
in fact join different groups. From the original group's point
of view, that is apostasy; from the new group's point of view,
it is conversion. And from the State's point of view? The
answer to that question will require examination of the context
in which it is asked, not an automatic conclusion that one
identification or another must control.'08
In addition to whether an individual's exit is possible,
financially or psychologically,"° or whether we see the member-
ship issue in the way that a church sees it, serious questions
remain as to what types of interventions would resolve the
disputes."' If damage awards are ordered, the individuals held
108. In one case, for example, a court might say that the group can shun the former
member because (1) in the group's view one is always a member, and (2) the internal
discipline of the group and the example which must be taken to set for present members
require this result. In another case a court might say that the individual who left his
money ambiguously to "my church at the time of my death," must be taken to mean the
church he was most recently attending rather than the church that was boycotting him
though still claiming him as a member.
On this point it was said of Andrew Yoder: "Yoder lives in a free country and if he
does not want to obey the Amish law he can quit the Amish church. Despite this, Yoder
has insisted on remaining an Amishman, continues to wear a beard and wants to be
a unit of the Amish body." Berg, supra note 104, at 7. But perhaps the "Amish Body"
has many parts and "who decides this?" is a subject in itself. The 1947 Yoder case
indicates that Yoder's position was that he was no longer a member of the more
conservative group.
In another case, the court allowed a tort action by a former member against a church
which believed that members could join the church but could not withdraw from it. See
Guinn v. Church of Christ, 775 P.2d 766, 786 (Okla. 1989). In Guinn, the court distin-
guished between church's behavior towards members while still members and its behavior
against former members. Id. at 769-75, 777-85. See generally LYNN R. BUZZARD &
THOMAS S. BRANDON, JR., CHURCH DISCIPLINE AND THE COURTS (1987) (discussing remedies
for churches in dealing with church discipline issues).
109. John Hostetler has discussed the issue of freedom of movement and relocation
as a way of avoiding the strict meidung among the Amish. HOSTETLER, supra note 72,
at 311.
110. Although we can view the law as involving the application of rules, it is generally
thought that law also focuses on resolving disputes. Discussions of the use of law as
a tool for dispute resolution assume that the law's power is sufficient to the enterprise
[VOL. 25:3 & 4
SPRING AND SUMMER 1992]
liable may or may not pay them. Others may come forward to
pay, or the state may take more stringent measures to enforce
the awards, possibly creating a new victim class. Injunctive
relief-orders directed against the behavior itself- are likely to
be futile, both because the courts cannot mandate intimate
relations and because avoidance tactics would make it difficult
to know whether an order had been respected. It is not difficult
to imagine the shift from collective ostracism under the command
of a religious authority to individual ostracism (which the court
order would not prohibit) once the religious directive had been
withdrawn through state coercion. Indeed, it is tempting to think
that the state legal system, faced with this problem, might turn
to the defense of privilege as one way of avoiding the issue.
The lower court in Bear was extremely sensitive to the issue
of remedies:
Weighing heavily in this court's adjudication of the instant
dispute is the fact that if any injunction were granted, its
enforcement would be impossible, its effect nugatory. It is
a suggestion both idle and vain that the elusive nuances of
a marital relationship, or the varied complexities of economic
and social intercourse could be coercively reinstated by
injunctive relief. "'
All of this would be true without reaching the specific issue of
religious freedom. But, as the court pointed out, "[c]ompound-
ing the problem of enforcement is the collateral problem of the
injury-denial of religious freedoms-an injunction would work
upon Defendants. Neither precedent, nor conscience, nor logic
can support injunctive relief in such circumstances."" 2
B. Boycott in Several Contexts
Perhaps we can advance our understanding of what is involved
in the shunning cases by looking at a number of related cases,
related because they all involve the strategy of boycott or
and that the dispute can be terminated. A different view of the relation between law
and society might cast judicial intervention as just one step in the total picture of power
adjustment.
111. Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 24 CUMBERLAND L.J. 168,173 (1973). See
generally Roscoe Pound, The Limits of Effective Legal Action, 3 A.B.A. J. 55 (1917).
112. Bear, 24 CUMBERLAND L.J. at 173.
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avoidance-the so-called passive (but of course passive/aggressive)
remedy'13 of exclusion from community. The effort here is to move
away from a narrow First Amendment reading of shunning, which
would focus largely on the modern law of church and state.
Instead, the shunning issue is considered against the background
of group behavior generally and is compared with other
exclusionary sanctions. We can start with an example of a "no-
intervention" case; one in which an intact family shuns an adult
member. The concern for psychological child abuse may justify
removal of a child from a family which threatens him emotionally,
but I believe there is not yet such a claim that would protect adults
where the injury was based entirely on exclusion from the family."4
We then can move to political boycotts-for example, feminists
or others shunning movie houses which show pornographic films,
or consumer groups shunning certain products for reasons having
to do with consumer protection issues. We view these boycotts
as political expressions, and we assume that even though they
may involve, for example, intentional inflictions of emotional
distress, boycotters should not be subject to tort liability. The
boycott is allowed to proceed.
To illustrate this "no-intervention" possibility, we can review
a 1982 Supreme Court case, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co." 5
The case involved a boycott of white merchants in Mississippi
initiated by a local branch of the NAACP. The purpose of the
boycott was to secure compliance from the town's white
establishment with a long list of demands focusing on equality
and racial justice."6 Thus, it has been said that the case is about
"[e]conomic pressure to engage in political activity."117 Organizers
enforced the boycott against the white merchants by posting
"watchers" in front of various white-owned business places." 8
The boycott also was enforced against blacks, who were pressured
to participate in the boycott through a variety of tactics, at least
some of which were violent."9 The Mississippi courts found that
the NAACP had committed a common-law tort and held it liable
113. See State v. Glidden, 8 A. 890, 896-97 (Conn. 1887) (describing the origins of
the word "boycott" as arising from an incident where Captain Boycott, a landlord's repre-
sentative, was in effect shunned by angry tenants in 19th-century Ireland).
114. A remedy for intentional infliction of emotional distress in this context, for example,
seems unlikely, despite the obvious pain involved. In a marital context, issues of desertion
as well as issues of spousal abuse might become relevant.
115. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
116. Id. at 889.
117. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN & JESSE H. CHOPER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 515 (1991).
118. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 903.
119. Id. at 904-06.
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for damages.12 ° The United States Supreme Court reversed and
held that the Mississippi courts' ruling violated the NAACP's First
Amendment rights.
121
The Claiborne case involved several possible victim groups.
We can view the case as one involving black victims of the white
society. We can view the group of white merchants who sued
in the Mississippi courts for protection against the NAACP
boycott as victims.'22 There were also, at least in theory, black
victims who had been coerced by the group to which they belonged
by reason of skin color, though it is not clear whether they were
members of the particular organization operating on behalf of
blacks generally."
What was the relevant community here? We might say that
the NAACP was one part of a larger community-the republic.
We also might say that it was disciplining another part of that
community, the white merchants, because they failed to follow
(or failed to pressure others to follow) the rules of the whole,
which guaranteed justice to blacks.'2 Do we expect private
groups to do this? Or do we ordinarily leave such discipline to
the police or to the political process? The answer may well be
determined by whether we believe that all groups have access
to the political process or whether we believe that special judicial
solicitude may be in order to protect the access rights of those
who historically have been denied access to the process."2 Or
we might define the relevant community narrowly, not "the
republic" but "the black community." We also might say that
the black victims were being disciplined by a group-the NAACP.
But were they members? Was the NAACP authorized to
discipline on behalf of the black community as a whole?
Conceivably the black victims of the boycott might have said that
120. Id. at 890-96.
121. Id. at 932-34.
122. Do we have to strain to see this? We strain less if we recall Nazi boycotts against
Jewish merchants, or KKK boycotts against Catholic merchants. Hendrik Van Loon
did not believe that the latter had a place in his discussion of tolerance, being merely
"manifestations of bad manners and a lack of decent public spirit." HENDRIK W. VAN
LOON, TOLERANCE 169 (1925).
123. Similarly, in Yoder we might say that one victim was Andrew Yoder and other
victims were those members of the group who were frightened into joining the boycott
against Yoder by the threat of group sanctions.
124. This explanation might work, except that we usually think ofdiscipline as arising
out of a group's superior position in a hierarchical relationship.
125. See Soifer, supra note 4, at 390-91.
126. The question of membership is often, but not always, framed in the language
of contract law as the issue of entrance and exit. Different groups may have different
conventions regarding membership, and the state also may have an interest in the
question, particularly where religious freedom issues are involved.
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their sense of membership related more to the larger black
community or the town, for example, than it did to the NAACP.
If so, the NAACP was not disciplining members, but coercing non-
members.
As a final point, we can note that the case seems to concede
that "social ostracism" is a legitimate sanction; the Court referred
to "social ostracism" as if it was preceded by the word "mere." '
Presumably, the Court based its comment on the familiar idea
that the state has a monopoly on violence and that all other
sanctions are somehow less effective." This tends to minimize
the fact that nonviolent sanctions may be immensely powerful,
whether they involve the threat of dismissal from employment'9
or the threat of excommunication from a church.
The NAACP's actions in this case can be justified as an example
of the political use of boycott by an oppressed minority, persecuted
as a group and insisting on the right to respond as a group.3 0
It was a tort as an exercise of First Amendment rights. Perhaps
too, as was suggested recently, it was boycott as "a classic
instance of popular republican politics."'3' But perhaps we should
examine some other cases.
127. The Court said, "The use of speeches, marches, and threats of social ostracism
cannot provide the basis for a damage award. But violent conduct is beyond the pale
of constitutional protection." Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 933.
128. See JAMES W. Hufsr, LAW AND SOCIAL PIOCESS IN UN1TED SrATES HORY 268 (1960)
("[T]o take life, inflict physical pain, or confine the body were ways of enforcing rules
which [our] legal order recognized as properly held only at the command of law.").
Presumably, only the state is allowed to use violence because violence is the most effective
sanction.
129. Michael Walzer quotes R.H. Tawney: "[Tlhe man who employs, governs ....
He occupies what is really a public office. He has power, not of pit and gallows.., but
of overtime and short time, full bellies and empty bellies, health and sickness." MICHAEL
WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE, 293 n.* (1983).
130. It was a right which was not always obvious to the American legal system. As
Alexander Pekelis wrote: "Of course an individual may stop reading, or advertising in
[a newspaper]. But if a group decided not to patronize that paper and tried to induce
others to do likewise, the ghosts of criminal conspiracy, combinations in restraint, or
secondary boycott would be raised again them." PEKELIS, supra note 1, at 189. The labor
movement, he said, had made significant progress on this issue because "[clollective
bargaining was granted to labor by statute." Id. He noted that labor's second basic
right-to picket and to boycott-was won by "effecting a change of judicial attitude."
Id. Pekelis also saw the necessity of the group engaging the sympathies of the larger
society, so that in effect the boycott gets larger and larger. Id. at 193.
131. James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in
the American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA_ L. REV. 287,348 (1990). For discussions
of the right to consumer boycotts, see Lawrence A. Alexander & Maimon Schwarzschild,
Consumer Boycotts and Freedom of Association: A Comment on a Recently Proposed
Theory, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555 (1985) (proposing a conditional right to boycott and
influence government institutions); Michael Harper, The Consumer's Emerging Right
to Boycott: NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware and Its Implications forAmerican Labor Law,
93 YALE L.J. 409 (1984) (proposing a broad political right to boycott and influence
government institutions).
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Here is an example in which I think state intervention would
generally be thought appropriate and necessary: A fourth-grade
black child distributes Valentines to her white classmates. The
cards are torn up and returned to her as an element of her
exclusion from the classroom community of white children.132
I think we feel that, whether or not this is popular politics, this
type of behavior in public schools should not be allowed. It is
not that we feel that an injunction should necessarily be issued,
but that the teacher should do something."3 Why do we feel this?
Because the victim is a child; because the child's injury is
personal and immediate; because love has been met by hate in
the rejection of a gift; because the racism involved is palpable
and shocking, and we are trying as a society to rid ourselves of
racism; because there is a continuity in purposes between the
school room, the people in it, and the state; and because we doubt
that the wooden chairs in the classroom create a group whose
autonomy should be protected by the state. Perhaps we also feel
that the exit option is not available to the child-the state, after
all, insists that she be in school-or, if the option is available
(through private education, for example), it is too expensive to
consider realistically. Whatever social utility might be involved
in the collective acts here are plainly outweighed by the acute
injury inflicted.
What should we feel, then, about the Korean grocer doing
business in a black neighborhood who is boycotted by former
customers because he hit or killed a black customer whom he
believed to be stealing?"34 This case is more troublesome and
seems to fall somewhere between the NAACP case and the fourth
grader case. Is the grocer's injury personal and immediate like
the fourth grader's? Or is the injury economic, like that in
Claiborne Hardware? Is this victim similar to the victim of the
Nazi boycott-a person attacked by state-backed mobs? Or like
the victim of the KKK in a state opposed to racism? Is the
neighborhood the community whose membership is being purified?
Are we certain about the relation between the purposes of the
state and those of the neighborhood?. 5 If the neighborhood is
132. See PATRICIA WILLIAw, THE ALCHEmy OF RACE AND RIGHTS 89 (1991) (describing
the experience of her sister in what is, I assume, a public school context).
133. This could also be seen as a level of state intervention, of course, since the teacher
is seen here to represent the state.
134. See, e.g., Seth Mydans, Korean Grocer Convicted in Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
12, 1991, at 6.
135. That is, if we said "city" or "county," we would be dealing with a governmental
unit and could impute "purposes"-but what is a neighborhood? See, for example, the
discussion ofPoletown in John J. Buckowczyk, The Decline andFallofaDetroit Neighborhood-
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part of society and not the state, it may have objectives that are
completely different from state purposes." We assume that the
teacher is able to do something in response to fourth-grade racism,
both because it occurs in the classroom context and because of
the ongoing teacher/student relationship. Who is the comparable
figure in the grocer case? Finally, do we think that the grocer
should exit? Should he sell-be forced to sell-his business to
avoid the boycott?
In summary, I have tried to look at a range of factors in a
variety of cases to see why some are more likely candidates for
state intervention than others. In making such an evaluation,
the factors to consider are the nature of the injury, the possibility
and costs of exit or self-help, and the efficacy of state intervention.
The summary, if in the form of a chart, would look something
like this:
(A) Who is the plaintiff (target of the boycott)?
(1) White merchants?
(2) Small black child?
(3) Korean grocer?
(4) (Former) Amishman?
(B) In relation to that plaintiff and the boycott, how do we
view and weigh the problem of
(1) Consent (did the plaintiff consent to the system
in which she is being boycotted)?
(2) Exit (can the plaintiff withdraw from the situa-
tion, and if so in what way (physically, psycho-
logically) and at what cost)?
(3) Remedy (what is the state remedy and what
impact will it have)?
(4) Autonomy of the Group (to what extent is the
group one whose purposes are consistent with
those of the state)?137
To fill in the chart, we might try differentiating the cases and
say, for example, that the small child did not consent to the
Poletown vs. GM. and the City of Detroit, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49,50-54 (1984) (providing
a description of the birth, growth, and death of a Detroit neighborhood).
136. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713 (1988)
(discussing some writers' attempts to assimilate intermediate institutions to state purposes
by stressing the utility of groups and, in effect, turning them into small scale public institu-
tions). See generally Symposium: The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493
(1988).
137. These factors are, in part, reformulations of two of Chafee's concerns, the
"Strangle-hold" and the "Hot Potato" policies. See Chafee, supra note 27, at 1021-23,
1026-27.
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boycott and that Andrew Yoder did. Or we might reject this
attempt to distinguish the situations and say that, at some level,
in some way, there was consent in each of the cases (children's
consent given by their parents who consent to the social contract;
merchants consenting by opening a business which involves the
possibility of consumer-reactive boycotts). We also might say
that exit is possible but costly in all cases, and that the child is
least able to exit. Even as to autonomy, we might view all the
cases as being the same-the state standing ultimately in the
same supervisory role with respect to each internal group,
imposing certain minimum standards of process, for example,
on all group action-or we might say that there is and should
be the possibility of substantial discontinuity between the
purposes of groups inside the state and the state itself.3
The autonomy factor noted above raises both the issue of the
boycott's context, and the question of whether the case involves
adjustment of an ongoing, largely adversarial bargaining relation-
ship, or a breach within a preexisting community. Boycotts as
a means of political expression, for example, probably arise in
what we think of as adversarial settings. John Howard Yoder
explored this issue in arguing that labor conflict cases are not
an appropriate analogue for cases of membership discipline and
particularly not for shunning cases:
[A] labor boycott is applied to a party to whom the
boycotters' relation is one of conflict, with the intention
of prevailing in that conflict at the cost of the party
boycotted, in the case of shunning the person shunned
is an unfaithful member of the group, who has not always
been an economic rival, [and the group intends to benefit
the individual] by making him aware of what was involved
in his severing of fellowship with the group .... "'
There is "no intention of coercing him against his will, if he
does not honestly change his intention. " "
138. The point here is not to fill in the chart, but to suggest that such a chart may
have utility in thinking about these problems.
139. Yoder, supra note 68, at 76,93 (emphasis added). For an overview of state law
relating to different kinds of groups-unions, churches, families-see DAVID A. FUNK,
GROUP DYNAMIC LAw (1982).
140. Yoder, supra note 68, at 76, 93. Yoder continued with a discussion of the issue
of the secondary boycott:
And whereas in a secondary boycott an unrelated third party is threatened with
boycott should he deal with the boycotters' opponent, in the analogical Amish
situation the third party is also a former member of the group, and therefore his
relation to the group is actually not as a third party but as another second party,
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One can of course reject the analysis that distinguishes labor
and shunning cases. We can say, for example, that labor cases
arise not in a conflict setting but in a community setting
because workers often feel a dual loyalty to the union and to
the employer.14 1 We can note that hostility within a community
that reaches the point of faction and schism is as much a
conflict as any other noncommunal interaction; that the labels
"discipline" or "conflict," like the labels "rebellion" or "civil
war," have to do with raw numbers and power. But perhaps
if we avoid the terms "conflict" and "community" and look
instead at the nature of the injury suffered, we can recreate
John Howard Yoder's distinction in a way that is less
vulnerable to this criticism. We can say that the true injury
in a religious shunning case is not economic (as it is in a labor
case) but personal, an injury to relationships and to the self.
It is ongoing, immediate, pervasive. One cannot withdraw from
it to go home (as one can from the strike, or the grocery store)
because it attacks the very relations that inhere in the notion
of "home." From this perspective, religious shunning is most
like the case of the fourth grader whose valentine is rejected
by her classmates. It results in the same sort of pain. The
problem under this approach, then, is that the law does not
provide remedies for all pain. 142 If we think that the state can
and should intervene in the case of the child in public school,
does that mean that the same is true for a religious shunning
case? This is not obvious, not only because adults are involved,
whose status is dealt with in its own right and not as a part of the former conflict.
Nevertheless, these and other differences notwithstanding, boycott law is the closest
point of departure for attacking the problem.
Id.
Yoder's emphasis on individual will is pervasive in his treatment of the Amish position.
In effect, according to Yoder, one chooses, at every moment, whether or not to be a faithful
member.
141. On issues of dual loyalty, see FUNK, supra note 139, at 420-21 (stressing the
different ultimate purposes of the two groups).
142. If we conclude that the state should not intervene in the religious shunning
cases, this is not because the interest invaded is trivial. On the contrary, the interests
touched are very large, perhaps the largest in life, but of such a quality that the state
cannot do a great deal to protect them.
One might say, though, that the law often does "protect" such interests through a
monetary remedy. Perhaps that is what the legal system should do in these cases. If
injunctions won't work, money may at least help.
What would be the impact of seriously considering various tests for equitable
relief-clean hands, for example? Would the individual's earlier participation in the
shunning of another member constitute a bar to relief via estoppel? Is that why Andrew
Yoder said that he opposed the ban in general?
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but also because the religious community is not a public school
classroom. It is a group distinct from the state in contrast to
the schoolroom which, creates a group that is linked to the
state.
We can look to tort law for answers to these questions, noting
that this body of law has traditionally protected relationships
in various ways. However, even if tort law can offer a vocabulary
to facilitate state intervention, I doubt whether the loose
formulations of tort law can help us answer the normative
question of whether the state should intervene. One can say that
on particular facts there was no tort, or one can argue that a tort
was committed, but that because of some relationship (religious,
communal) the tort was privileged. One can respond, however,
that the privilege was somehow abused by the group and, thus,
unavailable. The result of a common-law torts analysis will be
a balancing of the individual's injury (and/or the state's interest)
against the community's interest and will involve some uncertain
mix of the factors noted above.
Another relevant legal vocabulary is introduced (although the
substantive questions remain the same) if the problem is framed
as one of protecting federal constitutional rights. Yet another
set of relevant concepts framing the questions is found in the
current academic discussions of liberalism and communitarianism.
143
One part of that discussion is precisely concerned with the question
of the relation of the liberal state, with its traditional concern
for tolerance, to groups which are themselves intolerant as, in
some dimension, they must be to be the sort of groups they are.
Even groups defined by casual circumstances-groups constituted
as those waiting for the street light to change-exclude those
who do not share those circumstances. 144 The conversation on
pluralism, in short, is inevitably linked to the discussion of inclusion,
exclusion, and tolerance.
CONCLUSION
Present discussions of tolerance typically focus on those who
are intolerant because they are racist or intolerant because their
world views are not those of the Enlightenment."4 The present
143. For a view of the communitarian critique as a recurrent corrective of liberalism,
see MichaelWalzer, The Communitarian Critique ofLiberalism, 18 POL. THEORY6 (1990).
144. Is this a problem of tolerance?
145. One example of this latter point is treating religious groups that refuse to use
secular textbooks as intolerant towards the values of the larger society of which both
that group and other groups are a part.
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legal academic conversation takes place in a context that is
extremely sensitive to issues of diversity and the strengths of
intermediate groups."
We might want to say that we are not looking for a framework
within which to approach these issues because we already have
one in the federal Constitution. But what do we mean by the
Constitution? 47 And, what understanding of the relations between
groups and the state does our Constitution assume at any point
in time? A position on the question of group autonomy would
seem to be part of the social-political reality that underlies
a constitution. This is the level of "inclination" that Chafee
invoked when he analyzed the issue of internal disputes and
associations as raising a classical conflict between the state
and groups:
Our reaction toward any particular dispute in a club or
trade union or church or college is almost sure to be
influenced by our inclination toward one side or the other
in this undying controversy. We shall be a bit more favorable
to judicial intervention if we believe that the state is the
sole ruler of all that goes on within its borders, and is the
necessary safeguard of the individual against the closely
pressed tyranny of associations. We shall be more doubtful
of the probable wisdom of state participation in the affairs
of such a group if we are accustomed to think of the state
itself as just one more kind of association, which, like the
others, should keep to its own functions, and which must
be judged according to the value and efficiency of the services
it renders us in return for rather high annual dues."
146. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Putting Up andPuttingDown: ToleranceReconsidered,
in COMPARATIVE CONSrITUTIONAL FEDERALISM 77 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1990) (discussing issues
of tolerance and their impact on cultural diversity).
147. For a discussion of different approaches to this question, see Richard S. Kay,
Comparative Constitutional Fundamentals, 6 CONN. J. INT L L. 445 (1991). On the issue
of underlying assumptions, see Richard S. Kay, PreConstitutional Rules, 42 OHIO ST. L.J.
187 (1981).
148. Chafee, supra note 27, at 1029 (citations omitted). Chafee's list of groups is
instructive. I think that we read Chafee's observations as if they were directed either
to churches (to which deference is owed under the First Amendment) or to social clubs
(the same, except, arguably, when implicated in business or professional life). Chafee,
however, did not restrict his concerns in this way. His distinctions were between business
(profit-making) and nonbusiness groups. The question that Chafee raised is still vital
for us.
It may be that we do not seek the ideal state because, as Robert Dahl suggested, we
find the costs too great. See ROBERT A. DAHL, AFrER THE REVOLLIMON? 36-37 (rev. ed. 1990).
[VOL. 25:3 & 4
SPRING AND SUMMER 1992]
Our sense of what the problem actually is also changes. It
is no longer enough to be tolerant of internal groups in Voltaire's
sense.14 9 In discussing these matters, we increasingly attempt
to go beyond tolerance, to see these issues from other points
of view, and to argue that our own frame of reference is only
one among many possible orientations.
But we do not say that this sensitivity beyond toleration means
that all things must be tolerated. That to which the group is
committed might be evaluated differently at different times
or places, but the principle that some things are not to be
tolerated is assumed, exactly because our own self-definition
requires that we do not tolerate certain things.150 The shunning
problem replicates this issue in a miniature society.
Groups and communities require for their self-definition that
some things not be tolerated as consistent with membership. '
5 1
As suggested earlier, if we, as the outsiders, engage in (official)
empathetic and compassionate behavior towards the individual
excluded, we damage the theory of multiple communities to
which at least one version of our pluralism is committed. If
we vindicate pluralism in theory, engaging in empathetic behavior
towards the group, we fail at the same time to assist a fellow
For a recent defense of the "activist" state against the attacks of both the right and the
left (critical legal studies) anti-statism, see Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 781 (1987).
149. See VOLTAIRE, PHIoSOPHICAL DICIONARY 482-89 (Peter Gay trims, 1962) (defining
toleration). The contrast here is between toleration that permits (or does not destroy)
and that which does not permit (and destroys and persecutes).
This idea of toleration provides the background for many discussions of the Bill of
Rights. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
The idea relates historically to an intolerance that was also murderous, arising in a context
in which those who knew the truth would not tolerate error. Voltaire, by contrast, wrote:
"We are all steeped in weaknesses and errors; let us forgive each other our follies; that
is the first law of nature." VOLTAIRE, supra, at 482.
Under the impact of egalitarianism and secularism, today we may ask not only that
groups not be murdered but that they not be burdened excessively. Our view of state
interference may be less official butchery than official failure to take into account group
needs or conditions of survival.
150. Because if we do tolerate them, we have colluded. Here is Martha Minow's statement
of the question for the state: "What mix of concerns for group rights or cultural preservation,
on the one hand, and individual rights and freedoms, on the other, should a given society
pursue if it hopes to respect cultural diversity without colluding in the domination or
oppression of some of its own members?" Minow, supra note 146, at 102. Minow notes
immediately that this statement of the issue is too simple because it omits problems
of political and economic organization, coordination, etc. See id. at 102.
151. Those things also may vary and change and become more or less in accord with
the sensibilities of dissidents who may gain more control over time. For example, chess
clubs may change into game clubs. We, inside or outside the community, may attempt
to redefine the group; "we" here may or may not include the state.
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member of our own community, an Amish-American 52 perhaps,
who asks for our assistance. The dilemma is a constant. Its
resolution is to be found in specific cases, rather than in a single
principle or rule.
The feeling for pluralism reduces itself more to a stance, or
a mind-set, than it does to an agenda or an answer. It becomes
a preoccupation more than a thesis, relating to horizontal rather
than vertical relations. Because we are here, our positions
on these issues matter, whether or not we intervene. A strong
central state in fact exists, and all parts of American society
are touched by it. Even a group like the Amish can achieve
only relative isolation in the United States. 1" One can hardly
see the walls in the photograph of the Amish courtroom scene,
but they are there, part of the towering monument of Erastus
Field.
152. See ED. HIsCH, JR, CULn'IRAL LITERACY: WHAT EVERY AMERICAN NEEDS TO KNOW
98 (1987) ("It is for the Amish to decide what Amish traditions are, but it is for all of
us to decide collectively what our American traditions are, to decide what 'American'
means on the other side of the hyphen in Italo-American or Asian-American.").
153. Hostetler and Huntington indicate that the Amish want "limited isolation."
See HOSTETLER & HUNTINGTON, supra note 61, at 6. They note also that "[ilt is only in North
America that the name and the distinctive practices of the Amish have survived." See
id. at 3.
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